Vulnerability Prediction Capability: A Comparison between Vulnerability Discovery Models and Neural Network Models by Mohavedi, Y. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Mohavedi, Y., Cukier, M. and Gashi, I. ORCID: 0000-0002-8017-3184 (2019). 
Vulnerability Prediction Capability: A Comparison between Vulnerability Discovery Models 
and Neural Network Models. Computers and Security, doi: 10.1016/j.cose.2019.101596 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/22680/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2019.101596
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
 
Vulnerability Prediction Capability: A Comparison 
between Vulnerability Discovery Models and 
Neural Network Models 
 
Yazdan Movahedia, Michel Cukiera , Ilir Gashib 
a Center for Risk and Reliability, University of Maryland, College Park, USA 
{ymovahed, mcukier}@umd.edu 
b Center for Software Reliability, City, University of London, London, U.K. 
ilir.gashi.1@city.ac.uk 
 
 
Abstract— In this paper, we introduce an approach for 
predicting the cumulative number of software vulnerabilities 
that is in most cases more accurate than vulnerability 
discovery models (VDMs). Our approach uses a neural 
network model (NNM) to model the nonlinearities associated 
with vulnerability disclosure. Nine common VDMs were used 
to compare their prediction capability with our approach. 
The different models were applied to vulnerabilities 
associated with eight well-known software (four operating 
systems and four web browsers). The models were assessed in 
terms of prediction accuracy and prediction bias. Out of eight 
software we analyzed, the NNM outperformed the VDMs in 
all the cases in terms of prediction accuracy, and provided 
smaller values of absolute average bias in seven cases. This 
study shows that NNMs are promising for accurate 
predictions of software vulnerabilities disclosures. 
Keywords— Vulnerability Discovery Model, Neural 
Network Model, Time Series, Vulnerability Discovery Process, 
Prediction, Software Reliability. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have modeled new vulnerabilities 
disclosure trends using data from a variety of vulnerability 
databases. The goal of most of these studies is to find the 
model, which fits best the vulnerability disclosure process 
and, using that model, to predict the number of 
vulnerabilities that may be discovered for a given product 
[1]–[6]. Predicting the frequency of disclosures for 
vulnerabilities is useful for vendors of these products as well 
as the end-users as it helps them with resource allocation. In 
addition,  such estimates can also provide useful 
information for evaluating the risk associated with a product 
that can be used by insurance companies [7]. 
Vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) were 
developed to predict future software vulnerabilities based 
on their historical behavior. Although VDMs are often 
accurate in terms of curve fitting, they might not perform 
well in prediction [8]. Indeed, VDMs are often not powerful 
enough to take the nonlinear nature of vulnerability 
disclosure into consideration.  
In this paper, we introduce a nonlinear modeling 
approach based on neural networks to predict the total 
number of software vulnerabilities in 30-day time intervals. 
We compare the prediction capability of the neural network 
model (NNM) with nine commonly used VDMs. We 
applied the models to vulnerability data associated with four 
well known operating systems (OS) (Windows, Mac, Cisco 
IOS (the OS associated with Cisco), and Linux), as well as 
four well-known web browsers (Internet Explorer, Safari, 
Firefox, and Chrome). 
Our work makes the following contributions: 
 We introduce an approach using NNM to model the 
nonlinearities associated with vulnerability 
disclosure; 
 We compare the  capability of the NNM and nine 
VDMs in predicting the total number of software 
vulnerabilities in 30-day time intervals on eight 
well-known software (We predicted the 
vulnerabilities reported in years 2016, 2017, and 
2018.); 
 We show that the NNM outperforms the VDMs in 
all the cases in terms of prediction accuracy, and 
provides smaller values of absolute average bias in 
seven cases. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
describes the related work. Section 3 describes the dataset 
used in the analysis. Section 4 lists the VDMs used in our 
analysis. Section 5 introduces the approach using an NNM 
to model discovery process of software vulnerabilities. 
Section 6 presents the results of using the dataset with the 
models for prediction. Section 7 discusses the main findings 
and some limitations. Finally, Section 8 presents 
conclusions and provisions for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Over the years, many vulnerability discovery models 
(VDMs) have been developed to predict future software 
vulnerabilities based on their historical behavior.  
The earliest effort at modeling software reliability was a 
Markov birth-death model [9]. A good overview of several 
software reliability growth models (SRGMs) that 
characterize the process of software defect-finding is 
provided in [2]. The earliest study on modeling the 
vulnerability discovery process [10] proposed the first 
VDM termed the Anderson Thermodynamic (AT) model. 
Rescorla [4], [5] proposed a VDM to estimate the number 
of undiscovered vulnerabilities. Alhazmi et al. [11] 
proposed the application of SRGMs to vulnerability 
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discover modeling. They also introduced a logistic VDM 
known as Alhazmi–Malaiya Logistic (AML) model, which 
assumes a symmetrical shape around the peak discovery 
rate value [6]. A Weibull distribution-based VDM was 
proposed by Kim [12]. Li et al. [13] empirically showed 
that, in comparison to other reliability models, a Weibull 
model is better for defect occurrence across a wide range of 
software systems.  
Several studies applied existing VDMs or a modified 
versions of them to different types of software packages, 
such as OSs and web servers, to simulate the vulnerability 
discovery rate and predict the number of vulnerabilities that 
may potentially be present but not yet found [14]–[17]. 
Other studies tried to increase the accuracy of vulnerability 
discovery modeling by taking the skewness of the 
vulnerability data into consideration [8] or using the 
clustering techniques [18], [19], commonly used in social 
media studies [20] . 
In recent years, some software vulnerability disclosure 
process models were developed using traditional time series 
models like Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARIMA) 
[21]. However, vulnerability disclosure data contain a lot of 
nonlinearity and thus traditional time series models might 
not be appropriate [22]. Pokhrel et al. [23] compared the 
modeling capability of linear and nonlinear time series for 
three OSs (i.e. Windows 7, Mac OS X, and Linux Kernel). 
They developed models based on ARIMA, Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN), and Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
settings.  
III. DATASET 
The dataset used in this paper was collected from the 
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) maintained by 
NIST, and collected using the same approach followed by 
[24]. We leveraged the vulnerability CVE IDs to compare 
the reporting date of each vulnerability in NVD with the 
dates in other public repositories on vulnerabilities1. We 
updated the reporting dates to the earliest date that a given 
vulnerability was publically known in any of the 
vulnerability databases they used. 
We will analyze the reported vulnerabilities associated with 
four well-known OSs: Windows (1995-2018), Mac (1997-
2018), Cisco IOS (the OS associated with Cisco) (1992-
2018), and Linux (1994-2018), as well as four well-known 
web browsers: Internet Explorer (1997-2018), Safari (2003-
2018), Firefox (2003-2018), and Chrome (2008-2018). 
These software have been selected because they are the 
most widely used and have the most vulnerabilities in the 
database. Figure 1 shows the detection frequency of all 
vulnerabilities associated with each software over time 
intervals of 30 days. We also plotted the 180-days moving 
average (MOVAVG) for each software to gain a better 
understanding of vulnerability detection trend. As is shown, 
the maximum value of MOVAVG for all cases occurred 
after 2015. For each software, the variable we used in this 
research is the cumulative number of vulnerabilities 
reported in 30-day time intervals. In other words, we 
divided the study period associated with a given software 
into intervals of 30 days, and counted the total number of 
vulnerabilities detected in each time interval.  
For each software, we analyze all vulnerabilities 
reported for any of its versions. Thus, for each software, all 
TABLE I.  NUMBER OF VULNERABILITIES PER SOFTWARE 
OS  Windows Mac Cisco IOS Linux 
Total 3434 2908 698 5812 
Train 2472 2081 522 3184 
Test 962 827 176 2628 
Web Browser  IE Safari Firefox Chrome 
Total 1862 994 1784 1906 
Train 1289 701 1331 1229 
Test 573 293 453 677 
 
    
    
  Histogram of the number of detected vulnerabilities per 30 days together with its 180-days moving average for the studied OSs and 
Web browsers. The X-axis represents time (Year). The Y-axis shows the frequency of discovered vulnerabilities over 30 days time 
intervals. The dark and light colors show data associated with the training and test datasets (see Section VI).  
                                                          
1 We looked at the following ones: http://www.cvedetails.com/, 
https://cxsecurity.com/, http://www.security-database.com/ and 
http://www.securityfocus.com/  
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  Classification of Considered Time-based VDMs 
the vulnerabilities reported for any of its versions were 
included. For instance, all the vulnerabilities reported for 
mac_os, mac_os_server, mac_os_x, and mac_os_x_server 
were put together to create a vulnerability database for Mac.  
In addition, regarding our analysis, we divided the 
vulnerability dataset associated with each software into two 
groups; training and testing. The training data set consists 
of all the vulnerabilities reported before 2016. The testing 
data set consists of vulnerabilities reported in years 2016, 
2017, and 2018. Table I represents the total number of 
vulnerabilities per software, as well as the number of 
vulnerabilities in the train and test datasets. 
IV. VULNERABILITY DISCOVERY MODELS (VDMS) 
Vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) can be 
classified into two categories: time-based and effort-based 
VDMs. Time-based VDMs count the vulnerabilities of a 
given software as a function of calendar time while the 
effort-based VDMs, introduced by Alhazmi et al. [6], 
consider changes in environmental factors over lifetime of 
the software such as number of installations, share of 
installed base of a specific software, etc. (see [6] for more 
information regarding effort-based models). In this paper, 
we will only use time-based models since the data sources 
we have used only have data about vulnerability report 
dates, and not installations of the different software. Figure 
2 shows a classification of time-based VDMs used in this 
research based on [16]. These models are the most common 
VDMs used in the literature. We considered at least one 
model from each class.  
S-shaped VDMs divide the process of vulnerability 
discovery into three phases as shown in Figure 3. Phase 1 
represents the learning phase, which starts from the 
introduction of the software and continues until the 
beginning of the period referred to as “Sustained Growth” 
as a consequence of increasing popularity of the software 
[8]. During the learning phase, the vulnerability discovery 
intensity function is an increasing function. Phase 2 or the 
linear phase is the period when most of the vulnerabilities 
are expected to be detected.   
TABLE II.  TABLE OF MODELS AND THEIR EQUATIONS 
Model Equation 
NHPP Power-law [18] Ω(𝑡) = (𝛽−𝛼). 𝑡𝛼  
Gamma-based VDM [8] Ω(𝑡0) = ∫
𝛾
Γ(𝛼)𝛽𝛼
𝑡𝛼−1𝑒
−
𝑡
𝛽
𝑡0
𝑡=0
𝑑𝑡  
Weibull-based VDM 
[12] Ω(𝑡) = 𝛾{1 − 𝑒
−(
𝑡
𝛽
)
𝛼
}  
AML VDM [6] Ω(𝑡) =
𝐵
𝐵𝐶𝑒−𝐴𝐵𝑡+1
  
Normal-based VDM [8] Ω(𝑡) =
𝛾
1+𝑒−
(𝑡−𝜇)
𝑠
  
Rescorla Exponential 
(RE) [5] Ω(𝑡) = 𝛾(1 − 𝑒
−𝜆𝑡) 
Rescorla Quadratic 
(RQ)[5] Ω(𝑡) =
𝐴𝑡2
2
+ 𝐵𝑡 
Younis Folded (YF) 
[25] 
Ω(𝑡) =
𝛾
2
{erf (
𝑡 − 𝜏
√2𝜎
) + erf⁡(
𝑡 + 𝜏
√2𝜎
)} 
Linear Model (LM) 
[26] 
Ω(𝑡) = 𝐴𝑡 + 𝐵 
 
 
  Three Phases for S-shaped Models 
The intensity function of this phase is constant. Phase 3 or 
the saturation phase is the period when most of the 
vulnerabilities have been discovered [16]. The vulnerability 
discovery intensity function for the saturation phase is 
decreasing. This phase will not appear as long as a 
significant number of vulnerabilities are still undetected. 
The five S-shaped VDMs used in the paper based upon 
their capability in modeling skewed data can be classified 
as follows: two right-skewed distributions (Gamma-based 
VDM, Younis Folded VDM), one flexible-skewed 
distribution (Weibull-based VDM), and two symmetrical 
distributions (Alhazmi–Malaiya Logistic (AML) model and 
Normal distribution-based model). These VDMs are 
selected because they are the most well-known VDMs used 
in modeling the vulnerability discovery process [8].  
In addition, we have also included four non-S-Shaped 
VDMs: Rescorla Exponential (RE) model, Rescorla 
Quadratic (RQ) model, NHPP Power-law model, and 
Linear model (LM). More information about the Rescorla 
models and the linear model can be found in [5] and [26], 
respectively. When modeling the mean cumulative number 
of failures Ω(𝑡) for software reliability evaluations, models 
derived from a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) 
are often used. Allodi [27] showed that the discovered 
vulnerabilities may follow a Power-law distribution. The 
model used in this paper was applied on vulnerability data 
as a VDM in [24] [18]. The main assumption of this model   
Time-based 
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 The NNM Architecture Used for Our Study 
is that the number of discovered vulnerabilities follows a 
nonhomogeneous Poisson process. In addition, in NHPP-
based software reliability growth models (SRGMs), the 
intensity function (⁡ω(t) = dE[Ω(t)]/dt) is considered to be 
a monotonic function [28].  
The equations of all the discussed models are presented 
in Table II.  
V. NEURAL NETWORK MODEL (NNM) 
Neural network models (NNMs) consist of a set of 
algorithms for modeling and recognizing patterns. NNMs 
have been widely used for predicting data with sequential 
time series data such as monthly electricity demand of a city 
or stock price [22], [29], [30]. Unlike VDMs, NNMs are 
capable of integrating the nonlinearity that exist in noisy 
time series data. In addition, NNMs are not built upon 
assumptions regarding the form of the basic model since 
they are completely data driven models. In other words, 
NNMs are flexible nonlinear data driven models with 
powerful prediction power. Data driven models are very 
useful for the cases, where there is not any appropriate 
theoretical guidance to explain data generation process. It 
has been empirically shown that NNMs are capable of 
predicting both linear and nonlinear time series of different 
forms [31]. 
In this study, to predict the number of discovered 
vulnerabilities getting over time for a given software, we 
use a feedforward NNM, which is the most widely used 
neural network [22]. Feedforward NNMs accept a fixed 
number of inputs at a time and generate one output. We 
assume that the number of future vulnerabilities depend on 
the number of vulnerabilities disclosed over the past periods 
(lags).  
In this study, we use a single hidden-layer NNM for one 
step-ahead forecasting. According to [32], a single hidden 
layer NNM is capable of approximating any non-linear 
function with arbitrary precision. Figure 4 shows the 
structure of the NNM used in our study. Our feedforward 
NNM consists of three layers called input, hidden, and 
output. Each layer is a collection of neurons (nodes) where 
the connections are governed by the corresponding weights. 
Data have been fed through the input layer, and then they 
pass through the one or more hidden layers, and the final 
outcome is provided by the output layer. 
To predict the present value, several past observations 
are used. In other words, the inputs are a p-element subset 
of the set {𝑦𝑡−𝑝, . . . , 𝑦𝑡−2, 𝑦𝑡−1}; and 𝑦𝑡  is the output or the 
total number of vulnerabilities reported in period t. 
Equations 1 and 2 show the formulas associated with the 
input and output values of the hidden layer, respectively. 
For the output layer, the input and output values are 
represented by Equations 3 and 4, respectively. 
𝐼𝑗 = ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑖 × 𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 ⁡
𝑡−1
𝑖=𝑡−𝑝
⁡⁡⁡(𝑗 = 1,… , ℎ),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(1) 
𝑦𝑗 = 𝑓ℎ(𝐼𝑗)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(𝑗 = 1,… , ℎ),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(2) 
𝐼𝑜 = ∑𝑤𝑜𝑗 × 𝑦𝑗 + 𝛼𝑜
ℎ
𝑗=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(𝑜 = 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(3) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓𝑜(𝐼𝑜)⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(𝑜 = 1),⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(4) 
I denotes the input; y denotes the output; p and h are the 
number of input and hidden layer nodes, respectively; 𝑤𝑗𝑖  
represents the connection weights of the input and hidden 
layers; and 𝑤𝑜𝑗  denotes the connection weights of the 
hidden and output layers. The bias values of the hidden and 
output layers are respectively shown by 𝛽𝑗 and 𝛼𝑜, and are 
always between -1 and 1. 𝑓ℎ and 𝑓𝑜 are the non-linear 
activation functions associated with the hidden and the 
output layers, respectively. As the hidden layer activation 
function, we used a hyperbolic tangent function since it is 
the function that most widely used [22].  
The initial step in designing a NNM is to determine the 
optimal number of input nodes (lags) and hidden layer 
nodes. Based on the literature, there is no systematic 
approach [22]; the most common way of identifying the  
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  Plots associated with training phase of the proposed NNM for Cisco IOS  
appropriate number of the nodes (input and hidden) is via 
trial and error based upon finding the minimum mean 
square error (MSE) of  a subset of the training data, used for 
initial test and validation [33]. We followed the 
optimization approach based upon the algorithm (ADE-
BPNN) introduced in [22] to identify the optimal number of 
inputs (lags) and the number of hidden nodes  the time series 
associated with each software. In [22], it is shown that using 
ADE-BPNN improves prediction accuracy relative to basic 
NNMs, autoregressive integrated moving average model 
(ARIMA), and other hybrid models for time-series data. We 
evaluated up to 50 hidden nodes for each time series and 
chose the number of hidden nodes that minimized the MSE. 
We started with statistically significant lags derived from 
the process of evaluating the partial autocorrelation function 
(PACF) associated with each time series. In time series 
analysis, PACF gives the linear partial correlation of a time 
series with its own lagged values and evaluated [34]. 
However, we cannot only rely on the lags we found from 
the PACF since, in such case, the selection of inputs would 
be merely based on the identification of a linear model, 
while the goal for using NNM is to capture non-linear 
correlations, as well. A very good review of existing input 
selection methods for NNMs is provided in [35]. 
The NNM developed in this paper was programmed 
using Matlab R2018a. For each software, we began our 
analysis by dividing the vulnerability dataset into two 
groups; training and testing. We used identical data points 
for both modeling approaches (VDMs and NNM). The 
training dataset consists of all the vulnerabilities reported 
before 2016. The testing data set consists of vulnerabilities 
reported in years 2016, 2017, and 2018. NNM training is a 
complex nonlinear optimization problem. Thus, there is the 
possibility to get trapped in local minima of the error 
surface. To avoid getting poor results, the training process 
should be repeated several times with different random 
starting weights and biases [31].  
We set the maximum training number equal to 500 
epochs. Epoch stands for the total number of times a given 
dataset is utilized for training and shows the number of 
times the weights in a network were updated [36]. Since 
model optimization in deep learning algorithms is done 
using the gradient decent method [37], it makes sense to 
pass the learning dataset through the network multiple times 
accordingly to update the weights and achieve a more 
accurate forecasting model [36]. We used the Levenberg-
Marquardt (LM) method as our learning function. The 
activation function of the hidden and output layers are the 
tansig and purelin functions, respectively. To avoid 
overfitting/over training, for each software, we employed a 
cross validation method by splitting our dataset into three 
subgroups of training data (70%), validation data (15%), 
and test data (15%); and checked the validation 
performance of the trained network via metrics provided by 
Matlab Neural Network toolbox such as gradient decent 
(gradient threshold=1.00e-4) and maximum number of 
validation checks (max_fail=100). These metrics served as 
stop conditions of the training phase. Whenever the 
parameters of the network under training met any of these 
thresholds, the training process was stopped. Figure 5 shows 
the plots associated with the training phase of the NNM for 
Cisco IOS. As it is shown, based on the error plot of train 
data, there is no sign of overfitting. Moreover, the plots 
associated with the test subgroup of training data shows that 
the model performed well in the training phase. 
VI. RESULTS 
We used the nine VDMs and one NNM for the 
discovery process of vulnerabilities in eight well-known 
software (four OSs and four web browsers). The VDMs 
were fitted to the  datasets using a non-linear regression 
method described in [16].   
The analysis of the prediction capability started by 
dividing the data into two groups of training and test data. 
Both the VDMs and the NNM use a dataset that includes all 
vulnerabilities reported for all versions of a given software. 
The training period starts from the time when the first 
vulnerability associated with a given software was 
discovered and continues until 12/31/2015. We calculated 
the predictions for the years 2016, 2017, and 2018. As it is 
shown in Figure 1, the dark and light bars show the data 
associated with training and test datasets, respectively. We 
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split the vulnerability data into intervals of 30 days as is 
common in the vulnerability analysis literature [8], [15], 
[16]. 
For the VDMs, during the training period, the training 
data was used to estimate model parameters. To avoid 
overfitting, 10-fold cross validation was also conducted on 
the training data. The estimated final values for each 
interval produced by the nine models were compared with 
the actual number of vulnerabilities to calculate the 
prediction accuracy. For the NNM, for each software, we 
used the training data to train the NNM. Using the trained 
NNM, we predicted the next values for the intervals in the 
prediction period. The prediction accuracy is based on the 
comparison between the obtained estimation and the actual 
number of vulnerabilities.  
For the training part, for VDMs, we applied the Chi-
square (χ2) goodness of fit test [16] to assess how well each 
model fits the training datasets. The χ2 statistic is calculated 
using the following equation:  
χ2 =∑
(𝑆𝑖 − 𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(5)
𝑁1
𝑖=1

where 𝑆𝑖 and 𝐸𝑖 are the simulated and expected observed 
values at 𝑖𝑡ℎ time point, respectively. N1 is the number of 
observations in the train dataset (the time blocks used for 
simulation). For the fit to be acceptable, the corresponding 
χ2 critical value should be greater than the χ2 statistic for 
the given alpha level and degrees of freedom. We selected 
an alpha level of 0.05. The null hypothesis indicates that the 
actual distribution is well described by the fitted model. 
Hence, if the p-value of the χ2 test is below 0.05, then the 
fit will be considered unsatisfactory. A p-value closer to 1 
indicates a better fit. For each VDM, before evaluating its 
predictive capability, first we check whether it is 
statistically sound or not. If it is not sound (p-value<0.05), 
we neglect that model in our evaluation process.  
For the training part, for the NNM, out of the models 
trained with different number of lags, the optimal analytical 
model was selected based on the MSE value. Finally, for 
each software, the best selected analytical model was used 
to make the prediction for the testing data set (the 
vulnerabilities reported in 2016, 2017, and 2018). In this 
study, regarding the NNMs, we just reported the results 
associated with the best NNM since it was not possible to 
include all the trained NNMs per software with different 
combination of lags due to space limit.  
We calculated two normalized predictability measures, 
average error (AE) and average bias (AB) [8]. AE is a 
measure of how well a model predicts throughout the test 
phase, and AB indicates the general bias of the model which 
assesses its tendency to overestimate or underestimate the 
number of discovered vulnerabilities. AE and AB are 
defined as: 
𝐴𝐸 =
1
𝑁2
∑|
Ω𝑡 − Ω
Ω
|
𝑁2
𝑡=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(6)
𝐴𝐵 =
1
𝑁2
∑
Ω𝑡 − Ω
Ω
𝑁2
𝑡=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(7)
where N2 is a total number of time points (one per 30 days) 
over the prediction period, and Ω is the actual number of 
total vulnerabilities at time t, whereas Ω𝑡 is the estimated 
number of total vulnerabilities at time t. 
In addition, for the VDMs, we report ΔAE𝑖, which 
represents the percentage of difference between the AE of 
the i-the model and the model with minimum AE. 
 
ΔAE𝑖 = (AE𝑖 ⁡− AE𝑚𝑖𝑛) ∗ 100⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(8) 
where AE𝑖 is the AE of the i-th model, and AE𝑚𝑖𝑛 is the 
lowest AE one obtains among the set of models examined 
(i.e., the best model).  
The root mean square error (RMSE) is another metric 
often used to calculate fitting errors. However, Mentaschi et 
al. [38] showed that for some applications (e.g., high 
fluctuation of real data) the lower values of RMSE are not 
always a reliable indicator of the accuracy of simulations. 
Hence, a corrected estimator HH was proposed by Hanna 
and Heinold [39]: 
𝐻𝐻 =⁡√
∑ (𝑆𝑖 − 𝑂𝑖)2
𝑁2
𝑖=1
∑ 𝑆𝑖𝑂𝑖
𝑁2
𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡(9)
where 𝑆𝑖 is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ simulated data, 𝑂𝑖  is the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ observation 
(test data) and N2 is the number of observations in test 
dataset (the time blocks used for simulation). The closer to 
zero HH is, the more accurate the model.  
Tables III- IV present the values of AE, AB, HH, ΔAE𝑖, 
and p-value (we used * to show the models with p<0.05) for 
the cases we analyzed per model (VDMs and NNM), 
respectively. We also used the term “NS” as the ΔAE𝑖 value 
of the models with p<0.05, which stands for Not 
Satisfactory. AB can be positive (for overestimation) or 
negative (for underestimation), while AE is always positive. 
In each case, we first found the best VDMs by comparing 
their prediction accuracy and then compared the accuracy 
of those models with the NNM. In other words, for the 
VDMs, the model that has the smallest value of AE was 
selected as having the best prediction capability and is 
highlighted in yellow. In addition, the VDMs with ΔAE𝑖 <
2 were also selected as the best forecasting VDMs, which, 
show similar prediction capability compared to the best 
model (the model/models with ΔAE𝑖 = 0). In addition, the 
normalized error values ((Ω𝑡 − Ω)/Ω) associated with each 
case are plotted in Fig. 6. As it is shown, the models with 
less fluctuations yield higher accuracy.  
Based on the results provided by tables III-IV, in terms 
of prediction accuracy (AE and HH), the NNM led to most 
accurate results in all of the eight software we analyzed. To 
be more precise, for Windows, the NNM’s average error 
(AE) is 2.6%, and, at least, is 1.1% smaller than the AEs 
associated with the best VDMs, which were Power-law and 
RQ. For Mac, the NNM outperforms the best VDMs  
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TABLE III.  PREDICTION ACURRACY FOR OSS (VDMS & NNM) 
 Windows  Mac 
 AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value  AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value 
Gamma 0.063 -0.061 0.095 2.568 0.686  0.218 -0.218 0.263 14.373 0.193 
Weibull 0.091 -0.091 0.131 5.454 0.936  0.233 -0.233 0.287 15.880 0.703 
AML 0.138 -0.138 0.187 NS 0.011*  0.278 -0.278 0.351 20.401 0.301 
Normal 0.138 -0.138 0.187 NS 0.011*  0.278 -0.278 0.351 20.401 0.301 
Power-law 0.037 0.025 0.040 0.000 0.466  0.074 -0.074 0.080 0.000 0.138 
RE 0.106 0.106 0.100 NS 0.026*  0.024 0.017 0.037 NS 0.000* 
RQ 0.039 0.030 0.042 0.205 0.888  0.082 -0.082 0.090 0.776 0.193 
YF 0.114 -0.114 0.158 7.687 0.200  0.256 -0.256 0.320 18.195 0.193 
LM 0.192 -0.192 0.235 NS 0.001*  0.313 -0.313 0.392 NS 0.000* 
NNM 0.026 -0.018 0.036 NA NA  0.021 -0.019 0.025 NA NA 
 Cisco IOS  Linux 
 AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value  AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value 
Gamma 0.018 0.001 0.025 0.000 0.900  0.268 -0.268 0.353 7.804 0.640 
Weibull 0.019 0.006 0.028 0.106 0.901  0.267 -0.267 0.352 7.751 0.640 
AML 0.076 0.076 0.088 5.776 0.660  0.272 -0.272 0.366 8.249 0.335 
Normal 0.076 0.076 0.088 5.775 0.660  0.272 -0.272 0.366 8.248 0.335 
Power-law 0.019 0.006 0.028 0.114 0.232  0.267 -0.267 0.352 7.734 0.640 
RE 0.131 0.131 0.148 11.304 0.142  0.190 -0.190 0.239 0.000 0.506 
RQ 0.154 -0.154 0.172 NS 0.000*  0.278 -0.278 0.369 8.851 0.222 
YF 0.092 0.092 0.108 7.427 0.941  0.240 -0.240 0.313 4.991 0.109 
LM 0.422 -0.422 0.567 NS 0.000*  0.441 -0.441 0.643 NS 0.000* 
NNM 0.017 -0.014 0.024 NA NA  0.041 0.026 0.044 NA NA 
TABLE IV.  PREDICTION ACCURACY FOR WEB BROWSERS (VDMS & NNM) 
 IE  Safari 
 AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value  AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value 
Gamma 0.233 -0.233 0.272 9.251 0.624  0.156 -0.156 0.201 12.634 0.245 
Weibull 0.233 -0.233 0.272 9.205 0.624  0.187 -0.187 0.245 15.704 0.739 
AML 0.157 -0.157 0.175 NS 0.003*  0.231 -0.231 0.304 NS 0.048* 
Normal 0.157 -0.157 0.175 NS 0.003*  0.231 -0.231 0.304 NS 0.048* 
Power-law 0.233 -0.233 0.271 9.198 0.624  0.030 0.026 0.037 0.000 0.378 
RE 0.149 -0.149 0.164 0.818 0.403  0.133 0.133 0.141 NS 0.012* 
RQ 0.232 -0.232 0.270 9.096 0.624  0.041 0.040 0.047 1.087 0.549 
YF 0.141 -0.141 0.155 0.000 0.285  0.211 -0.211 0.278 18.093 0.986 
LM 0.384 -0.384 0.501 NS 0.012*  0.204 -0.204 0.248 NS 0.009* 
NNM 0.066 -0.066 0.072 NA NA  0.027 0.024 0.034 NA NA 
 Firefox  Chrome 
 AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value  AE AB HH %𝜟𝑨𝑬𝒊 p-value 
Gamma 0.051 0.035 0.066 0.151 0.378  0.281 -0.281 0.367 0.000 0.735 
Weibull 0.049 0.031 0.064 0.030 0.307  0.317 -0.317 0.422 3.578 0.735 
AML 0.081 -0.081 0.112 NS 0.012*  0.307 -0.307 0.405 2.569 0.641 
Normal 0.081 -0.081 0.112 NS 0.012*  0.307 -0.307 0.405 2.569 0.641 
Power-law 0.069 0.067 0.089 2.015 0.307  0.167 0.167 0.191 NS 0.000* 
RE 0.161 0.161 0.174 11.231 0.115  0.364 0.364 0.383 NS 0.000* 
RQ 0.096 0.096 0.113 4.696 0.193  0.077 0.077 0.102 NS 0.000* 
YF 0.049 -0.032 0.069 0.000 0.150  0.304 -0.304 0.402 2.269 0.117 
LM 0.101 -0.101 0.123 5.204 0.087  0.302 -0.302 0.374 NS 0.000* 
NNM 0.037 -0.012 0.051 NA NA  0.033 -0.013 0.038 NA NA 
(Power-law, and RQ) by having 5.3%, and 6.1% smaller 
average errors, respectively. For Cisco IOS, this difference 
is at least 0.1%. Linux and Chrome are two of the cases 
where the NNM provides far better predictions than those 
from VDMs by being 14.9%, and 24.8% more accurate. For 
IE, this difference is at least 7.5%. The average error of the 
NNM for Safari is 0.3% and 1.4% smaller than those from 
the best VDMs (Power-law and RQ).  
For Firefox, the NNM improved the predictions by 1.2%, 
1.4%, and 1.2% compared to YF, Gamma, and Weibull 
VDMs, respectively. For Chrome, the VDM with smallest 
AE is not statistically sound from the training part. So, we 
opt for the next VDM with p-value>0.05 and smallest AE, 
which is Gamma. In this case, the NNM accuracy 
improvement is 24.8%. Overall, the highest differences in 
prediction accuracy between the NNM and the VDMs were 
found in Chrome (24.8%), Linux (14.9%), IE (7.5%), and 
Mac (5.3%), respectively. 
Another factor, which plays an important role in model 
selection is the model tendency to overestimate or 
underestimate the results. In this research, we provided the 
average bias values (AB) as well as the visual fluctuation 
trend of normalized prediction errors (Figure 6). Based on 
tables III-IV, out of eight software we analyzed, in terms of 
magnitude of error, the NNM outperformed the VDMs in 
seven cases by having smaller |AB| values. Only for Cisco 
IOS, the absolute value of bias provided by the selected 
VDMs was at most 1.3% smaller than the one resulted from 
the NNM. For Windows, Mac, Linux, IE, Safari, Firefox, 
and Chrome, the bias magnitudes provided by the NNM 
were smaller than those from the best VDMs (in each case, 
we considered the best VDM, which had smallest |AB|) by  
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 Prediction errors for OSs and web browsers. The X-axis indicates time (Year). The Y-axis represents normalized prediction error 
values ((Ω𝑡 −Ω)/Ω). 
0.7%, 5.5%, 16.4%, 7.5%, 0.2%, 1.9%, and 26.8%, 
respectively. Overall, in terms of accuracy, out of the eight 
cases we analyzed, the NNM outperformed VDMs in all the 
cases. Besides, in terms of magnitude of bias, the NNM led 
to smallest bias values in seven cases.   
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
In terms of prediction accuracy (AE and HH), 
considering the OSs and web browsers, the NNM led to 
more accurate results than the best selected VDMs in all the 
cases. Considering only VDMs, the Power-law VDM was 
selected as the best model in four cases out of eight. The 
Gamma and RQ VDMs were each best compared with other 
models in three cases out of eight. The Weibull, RE, and YF 
VDMs were each best compared with other models in two 
cases out of eight cases we analyzed. 
In terms of overall magnitude of bias (i.e., absolute 
value of AB), out of the eight cases we analyzed, the NNM 
provided smaller absolute values of bias in seven cases 
compared to the best VDMs. Only for Cisco IOS, the 
absolute value of bias provided by the Gamma VDM 
(0.001) was smaller than the one resulted from NN (-0.014). 
We believe that the final decision, in equal accuracy 
conditions, in terms of bias, is up to the researcher to choose 
the best model based upon his/her priorities. However, from 
a security point of view, it is better to choose a model, which 
provides more conservative prediction results. In the current 
study, among the models that were selected as the best 
predictors, only two NNMs (Linux and Safari) provided 
overestimated results. Other selected NNMs 
underestimated the number of vulnerabilities. It can also be 
easily inferred from Figure 6, where for Linux and Safari 
most of the prediction points associated with the NNMs are 
located over the X=0 axis.  
In two cases (i.e. Linux and Chrome), the difference 
between the prediction accuracy of the NNM and the best 
relative VDM is very high (i.e. 14.9% and 24.8%, 
respectively). We believe that the reason behind these high 
value of differences is not associated with noise, since we 
took care of the noise problem in the data by using a cross 
validation technique. It is possible to assume that, for these 
three cases, the NNM was able to detect another playing 
factor in the relative vulnerability discovery processes that 
the analytical VDMs were not  [40].  
Overall, we believe that the NNM’s better performance 
compared to VDMs comes from the capability of the NNM 
in predicting the nonlinearity nature of the vulnerability 
disclosure time series. In addition, most VDMs consider the 
vulnerability discovery process as a pure S-shaped curve or 
a function with a monotonic intensity function with constant 
total number of vulnerabilities. However, the number of 
vulnerabilities associated with a given software may change 
as newer versions are released. Additionally, VDMs and 
traditional time-series functions only use one set of 
parameters for estimation. On the other hand, NNMs due to 
having multilayer perceptron structure, having multiple 
neurons per layer, and using different set of parameters per 
neuron provide a more complicated structure for prediction. 
Of course, the specific validation method we used to avoid 
being trapped by overfitting in the learning phase is another 
advantage of using NNMs.  
There are several limitations to our work that prevent us 
from making more general conclusions. The main limitation 
is with regard to using reported published date of 
vulnerabilities as their detection date. Vulnerabilities 
usually get detected earlier by malicious users than the time 
they are officially published. To make sure that this estimate 
is as close as possible to the actual date the vulnerability is 
known to the world, we looked at different vulnerability 
sources and opted for the earliest date reported for a 
vulnerability. Better estimates can be obtained if we have 
more accurate proxies for calculating attacker effort and 
more precise times on when a vulnerability is discovered 
and reported (for example, in the dark web), rather than 
when it is reported in a public vulnerability database. 
However, obtaining this data is difficult: data in the dark 
web is highly unstructured and very difficult to add meaning 
to what is mined.   
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Another limitation is with regard to the way we merged 
all vulnerabilities reported for all versions of a given 
software to have enough data for training the models. There 
are papers that apply VDMs to the vulnerabilities related to 
separate versions of software (e.g. Mac OS X) [16], [41] as 
well as studies that consider all versions of a software 
together [8], [18]. The first group assumes that each piece 
of software is an independent and well-defined product, but 
detecting the sources of dependency in vulnerability data is 
not an easy task.  
NNMs, unlike analytical models, are not 
mathematically tractable and cannot be easily interpreted by 
humans. However, they are capable of detecting the 
mechanisms that might be missed by the analytical models. 
Therefore, they can be used a guide for modifying those 
models. In this research, we showed that more accurate 
predictions are also possible using NNMs [40].  
VDMs assume that the time between failures represents 
total usage time of that product. What we are using is 
calendar time, which may not be a good proxy for usage. 
Crucially the difference in security is the difficulty in 
estimating the “attacker effort” - the total amount of time 
that an attacker spends in finding a vulnerability - which is 
something that is not needed for reliability (we assume the 
users accidentally encounter faults that lead to failures, 
hence usage time is a good enough proxy for time between 
failures). A useful discussion of this is given in [42]. 
Attacker effort is something that is very difficult to estimate 
and quantify. The purpose of our research is hence to make 
as good a use as possible of the publically available security 
data to help with decision making. But at the same time to 
be clear about the limitations on what we can conclude from 
this analysis. The best we can say from the analysis we 
present is “the total number of vulnerabilities that will be 
reported in the NVD over an interval t for product x is y 
with confidence z”. And we show that we can do this 
prediction better with NNM than with VDMs for four of the 
largest and most commonly used operating system and web 
browser families. For some decision makers this may be a 
valuable piece of additional information, which they can use 
in conjunction with data they have from their own 
installations, when deciding on operating systems and/or 
web browser, and provisioning of security support services 
to deal with new vulnerabilities. 
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we compared the capabilities of nine 
common vulnerability discovery models (VDMs) with a 
nonlinear neural network model (NNM) in terms of 
predicting the number of future vulnerabilities over a 
prediction period of three years. We applied the mentioned 
models to vulnerability data associated with four well 
known OSs and four well-known web browsers. The 
models were assessed in terms of prediction accuracy and 
prediction bias. The results showed that the NNM 
outperformed the VDMs in all the cases in terms of 
prediction accuracy. In terms of overall magnitude of bias, 
out of the eight cases we analyzed, the NNM provided the 
smallest absolute values of bias in seven cases compared to 
the best VDMs. This study shows that neural networks are 
promising for accurate predictions of the total number of 
publically reported software vulnerabilities over time.  
For future work, we plan to find the reason behind the 
observed gap between prediction capabilities of the NNMs 
versus VDMs, specifically for the two software that we 
found considerable difference. We will try to investigate 
whether current VDMs are missing a mechanism associated 
with the process of vulnerability discovery within their 
mathematical structure. We also plan to investigate other 
nonlinear model structures using machine learning 
algorithms. Among them are Recurrent Neural Network 
(RNN) models, used for prediction time series, which may 
perform better than NNMs at modeling dependencies 
between two points in a sequence. Generally, in NNMs, we 
have to choose the length of the input (number of inputs) 
beforehand. Then, it is not possible to learn functions that 
depends on the inputs that happened a long time ago. This 
problem could be solved by having an RNN, which can 
theoretically store information from arbitrarily long time 
ago.  
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